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Perspectives on the Political Legitimacy and Future of the European Union 
 
 
By  
Jessica Frydenberg1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The ongoing economic uncertainty in the European Union (EU), the unprecedented 
influx of immigrants and refugees, and the growing threat of terrorism, have raised 
questions about the long-term legitimacy, stability, and resilience of the EU. Little has 
been done by the EU administration to successfully address doubts in the hearts of its 
citizens. Can the EU administration turn things around for Europe? Does the EU 
administration have the power, the drive, and the resources to restore its citizens’ faith 
in the institution’s ability to address Europe’s problems, and if so how would they go 
about doing that? 
 
In 1958, following the Second World War, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
was formed in the hopes of peacefully bringing Western European countries together. 
Six nations, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, were 
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Abstract. The confidence that Informed Citizenry and their Economic Elites 
have in the European Union were assessed. Survey data, from the 2009 
Eurobarometer 72.4 with a sample size of 8,499 citizens, from 27 European 
nations, were supplemented with interviews with two professionals 
knowledgeable about EU politics and content analyses of current events, 
such as the EU debt crisis, the rise in terrorist attacks, the British 
Referendum, and the immigration crisis. Although both citizens and elites 
were confident about the EU’s future, voices of informed citizenry shaped 
the confidence in the EU more than economic elites. These findings 
substantiated the Systemic Coupling theoretical model more than the Power 
Elite model and contributed to the empirical literature on citizens’ trust in the 
EU and transnational political systems. Additional cross-temporal 
examination of citizens’ confidence in the EU and the roles of new media are 
warranted. 
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the first to join in forming the EEC to foster economic cooperation, minimize conflict 
between different European nations, and encourage democracy in member states. The 
EEC quickly grew and evolved to be a unique and powerful economic and political union 
that addresses policy areas ranging from human rights, the environment, security, 
climate change, and external relations with non-EU nations (Europa, European Union 
2016). With its core values based in the rule of law and respect for human rights and a 
fundamental purpose of fostering, promoting, and reinforcing social, political and 
economic harmony amongst European nations, the organization was officially renamed 
the European Union (EU) in 1993. As of 2015, the EU is comprised of 28 member 
states, covering over 4 million square kilometers (just over 1.5 million square miles) and 
protecting the rights of approximately 508 million inhabitants (Europa, EU 2016). To this 
day, these core values of human rights, democracy, and rule of law continue to be EU’s 
driving force and the root of its success but also the challenges they still face. 
 
It is in this historical context that my research on EU citizens’ confidence in the 
European Union, particularly in its political legitimacy, is located. With the rise in 
terrorism and immigration and the lingering effects of the economic crises in Member 
States, understanding citizens’ faith in the EU administration is important now more than 
ever to ensure the successful and stable future of the institution. It is also important to 
recognize that EU citizens’ confidence is dependent on their location on the political, 
social, and economic hierarchy. The political and economic elites, arguably the ones 
who benefit the most from the work and policies of the EU, are likely to have a more 
positive view of the EU and its legitimacy than the average citizen who has fallen 
through the cracks and whose needs are not addressed by their political leaders. Part of 
why the British, for example, voted to leave the European Union was that they felt only 
the EU elitists who ran the EU benefitted (Robertson 2016; Frum 2016). So whose 
European Union is it? Does it belong to the political elites or to the average citizen? 
 
To address these questions, confidence of citizens in the EU and its political legitimacy 
were examined through a dual lens, that of the political elites versus the average citizen. 
On the one hand, confidence could be all about how knowledgeable the average citizen 
is about the EU, its policies, and the organization’s responsibilities to the citizens. On 
the other hand, one could argue that it is really about one’s stake in how strong and 
stable the economic health of the EU, irrespective of knowledge. In other words, it 
would not matter how informed citizens are, but it would be the political and 
economically healthier citizens, the elites, that dominate the workings and future of the 
European Union. 
 
Knowledgeable citizens are vital for democracy to function properly; they are the voices 
that can drive changes in their lives to protect their rights, and liberties. If citizens are 
not informed adequately about the purpose of an institution and its policies, they will be 
unable to be engaged in a way that is truly representative of their needs and 
expectations. Because the European Union deals with not only economics, but also 
issues of justice, migration, environment, and human rights, it is necessary that citizens 
know and understand these issues in order for the EU administration to enact changes 
that will benefit the wider population. 
2
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In addition to how much working knowledge citizens have of the EU and its policies, 
their quality of life and economic health can also shape their opinions of the Union’s 
future. Even though the EU strives to improve the living standards, human dignity and 
freedom of all its citizens, it is quite likely that the economic and political elites benefit 
more from the system than the average citizen. If the elites are satisfied with their lives 
they may have more faith in the EU and the European leadership. In contrast, if the EU 
and its leaders cannot reduce disparities, the less privileged citizens are likely to lose 
confidence in the EU. It is reasonable to assume that those who have not benefitted as 
much from the system hold the EU responsible for their poor economic health and 
quality of life. The day-to-day experiences and standards of living of citizens are likely to 
define their confidence in the EU. 
 
In short, both the informed EU citizen and the EU elites have the power to influence 
confidence in the EU. A comparative assessment of the voices of knowledgeable 
citizenry and elites will be useful to the EU administration as it shapes its future policies. 
Because the EU is so vast and diverse, in terms of the history of its member states and 
because citizen confidence in the system can be expected to vary by region, analyses 
need to be disaggregated by EU regions, as in Western, Eastern, and Mediterranean 
nations. Findings from this study will add to the scholarship of the EU’s future as well as 
the sociology of transnational politics and government. 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Scholars of the extant literature reviewed below have focused on the political legitimacy 
of the EU, particularly trust in the EU and how informed citizens were about EU policies. 
Because the European Union is by nature a multilevel governing body that is structurally 
deeply intertwined with national governments, it has been argued that EU citizens who 
trust their own national governments were more likely to extrapolate that trust to other 
supranational political levels. EU scholars also found that citizens’ knowledge about the 
European Union, its history, governing bodies and their respective policies, can 
influence, both directly and indirectly, whether they trust and support the EU. Some 
researchers have also noted contradictions in the way citizens’ quality of life and their 
economic health shaped faith in the future of the EU.  
  
 
The Struggle for EU Legitimacy  
 
The struggle for EU legitimacy, both political and economic, is waged in the minds of the 
average citizen as well as its elites. Scholars have found that the political legitimacy and 
authority of the EU as an organization has fluctuated over the years depending on the 
context and environment at the time. Moreover, the Union constantly reshapes itself to 
better fit the needs of the people it serves. The EU’s legitimacy was also measured by 
whether EU citizens were satisfied with their lives and felt that they were benefitting 
3
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from being in an EU Member State. Other scholars argued that citizens’ confidence in 
the EU comes down to how well educated and knowledgeable citizens were about the 
EU, its history and its policies. The ways the EU administration communicated 
information regarding the EU and how much knowledge citizens had largely influenced 
what citizens demanded of the organization and if they believed in its legitimacy. 
 
 
EU Political Legitimacy 
 
At the heart of the European Union lays the ambiguous understanding and definition of 
the organization itself, McCormick (2014) argued. He posited that scholars, on the one 
hand, have defined the EU as a form of multi-level governance or consociationalism,2 
while other researchers have left the definition vague, calling it an international 
organization that oversees politics and economics across European nations. McCormick 
formally defined the EU as an international organization that is embedded in an 
intergovernmental system in which leaders from the governments of member states 
work together and create a singular set of policies, currency, market, and trade. The 
fluid and ambiguous nature of the EU create challenges for citizens as well as for the 
key players and leaders involved to understand and legitimate the organization. 
 
The struggle for political legitimacy and political trust is a story as old as the European 
Union and European integration itself and only continues to reinforce the vague 
definitions and roles of the EU (Sternberg 2013). Sternberg, in her work on the 
legitimacy of the European Union, asserted that the organization, despite surviving 
some of the most severe crises to date, is encountering growing skepticism and 
concern about how trustworthy and legitimate the Union itself is.3 In fact, the EU 
citizen’s understanding of legitimacy is much more fluid and continuously changing 
depending on the context at the time. Initially, the EU was created and was legitimized 
by European nations’ unspoken desire and agreement to create and maintain peace 
and prosperity across Europe, to serve the common good of the people. Over time, this 
view of legitimacy became much more about economic integration with goal of creating 
a common market objective. With the Maastricht Treaty4, otherwise referred to as the 
Treaty on European Union, the integration discourse evolved to include classic 
democratic ideals and related reforms. Through her detailed study of the historical 
meaning of EU legitimacy, Sternberg argued that European Union leaders continue, to 
this day, to struggle with formally defining and creating legitimacy around the 
organization, particularly with regards to what the EU should and should not be doing 
and how well the Union is meeting citizen expectations. 
 
                                                          
2
 Consociationalism is “a form of democracy which seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a state that 
comprises diverse societies (distinct ethnic, religious, political, national or linguistic groups), by allocating 
these groups collective rights” (Reut Institute, 2008). 
3
 Sternberg 2013: 1, 187-192. 
4
 The Maastricht negotiations took place in 1992 wherein leaders from various European nations met with 
the goal and intention of creating the first single [European] currency, the Euro, across sovereign nations 
in the modern world. 
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Other scholars have devoted attention to the shifting understanding of the nature of the 
EU. Beetham and Lord (2013), for example, while acknowledging legitimacy as 
something affiliated to political authority, noted that the EU is constantly changing to fit 
the needs of the organization and the people it serves. They defined legitimacy as a 
framework used to analyze and explain the different types of EU member governments 
and how and why citizens abide by the legal and political laws of organizations like the 
European Union or a national government. Beetham and Lord argued that political 
legitimacy of the EU and the European political space essentially comes down to the 
interactions, and intrinsic connections, between the EU and its member states. To these 
authors, political authority is only deemed legitimate and recognized if it is (a) legal, 
“acquired and exercised according to established rules”, (b) normative “the rules are 
justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs, and (c) democratically legitimate 
“positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation of 
appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate authorities” (p.3).  
 
EU political legitimacy has also been approached from the opposing end of the 
legitimacy-illegitimacy spectrum. Scholars, like Rousseau (2014), used a democratic 
deficit model and problems with legitimacy, to explain the failure of the EU to practice 
and operate in a democratic fashion. Rousseau, in his analysis EU’s democratic deficit, 
found that legitimacy, or more pointedly illegitimacies of the EU, came in two primary 
forms. Input-oriented legitimacy, based on the collective identity of the people, the 
average citizens, is “government by the people” (p.11) while out-put oriented legitimacy 
is dependent on common interests and goals, a “government for the people” (p.11). In 
both forms, new forms of decision-making, reliant on transparency and public 
participation, was deemed more popular and legitimate by the average citizen than the 
traditional, behind the scenes, methods of decision making and discussion between 
business and political leaders with minimal deliberation, benefitting primarily the elites. 
 
Political legitimacy is also a matter of trust, with its breadth of meaning and importance 
to all individuals, their nations, and transnational institutions. In the EU political context, 
extrapolation of citizens’ trust in the health of their national institutions to the EU has 
swung both ways. Researchers have empirically documented a positive association 
between citizens’ trust in national institutions and their trust in larger EU organizations. 
Harteveld (2013) defined trust as fundamental to a social system because it diffuses 
support through all levels of society. Political trust is the glue that keeps the political 
system together and is the “prime expression of [political] legitimacy” (p.543). Using 
data from the June – July 2009 Eurobaromater survey 71.3, administered in 30 Member 
States with approximately 1000 respondents per State, Harteveld found the logic of 
extrapolation5 to be the most influential in citizens’ confidence in the EU while the logics 
of identity6 and rationality7 to have little to no impact. Citizens’ confidence in the EU was 
                                                          
5
 The Logic of Extrapolation: If people were generally optimistic and trusting of things, it is highly 
predictable that they would be trusting of other institutions, people or situations. In short, if citizens trusted 
their national political institutions, they are likely to have faith in the European Union as well. 
6
 The Logic of Identity: Trust arose when citizens were able to identify with the state and its institutions 
because it [trust] is diffused through the community. 
5
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almost entirely rested on citizens’ trust in national institutions, regardless of their rational 
evaluation or emotional affiliation. The more they trusted their national governments, the 
more likely they were to trust the European Union too. 
 
A more specific form of extrapolation is how trust in domestic local governments 
translated into trust in supranational political institutions. Arnold et al. (2012) in their 
study of trust in EU institutions using 2005 – 2010 Eurobarometer survey data, found 
citizens’ trust in domestic institutions and local governments cultivated greater 
confidence in EU institutions. However, extrapolated trust was conditional to specific 
countries; domestic corruption levels explained away the positive association between 
trust in national institutions and the EU. Besides, when national corruption levels were 
low, citizens trusted their non-political and national institutions more than the EU. 
 
On the other hand, researchers have also found a negative relationship between 
citizens’ trust in national institutions and the European Union. In Munoz, Torcal, and 
Bonet’s (2011) analyses of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th waves of the European Social Survey 
(completed in 2004, 2005 and 2008 in all the then twenty-seven EU member states), 
trust in the national and European parliaments were intrinsically interdependent but also 
negatively extrapolated. Trust in a national institution or the local government created 
an upper limit standard in the minds of citizens, a standard they used to evaluate the EU 
and its institutions. In other words, the more citizens trusted their local government and 
institutions, the less confidence they had in the EU. But, when citizens had little trust in 
their national institutions, they tended to have more confidence in EU institutions. 
 
 
Economic Legitimacy of Institutions and Citizens  
 
The collective and individual quality of life of EU citizens has been another influential 
dimension of the EU’s legitimacy and citizen confidence in the EU. The Euro deficit, the 
rise in terror and crisis of legitimacy, and political ideologies, amongst other things, led 
the EU parliament and the EU to introduce a variety of economic reforms in the hopes 
of increasing citizen support and legitimacy of the European Union. 
 
Kumlin (2009), using the 2002 wave of the European Social Survey in 24 countries in 
and around Europe, discovered that citizens’ confidence in and support of the EU was 
significantly lower in larger member nations that adequately protected the health and 
wellbeing of its citizens. In other words, citizens’ who judged their quality of life as fairly 
good or great were more distrustful of the EU. In Western European countries, trust in 
the EU as a political institution was also directly fueled by their satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with national public services and organizations. Dissatisfied European 
citizens from nations that provided robust welfare benefits distrusted and blamed the EU 
for their misgivings. Kumlin concluded that citizens’ trust in the EU was dependent on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7
 The Logic of Rationality: Confidence is the rational result of citizens’ evaluations of the benefits received 
from the EU or other political institutions, more specifically aspects that served their personal interest or 
that they personally benefitted from. 
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perceptions of whether the EU member nation protected and cared for its citizens, 
especially those with financial or social needs. 
 
More specifically, citizens’ quality of life, measured by their socio-economic resources, 
perceived benefits from EU membership and life satisfaction, positively shaped 
confidence in the EU (Arnold 2012). The more satisfied citizens were with their quality of 
life and economic health, the more confidence they had in the EU. On the other hand, 
the economic debt crisis, which negatively impacted much of Europe and resulted in 
rising unemployment rates and lower wages, left citizens questioning what the EU was 
doing to ensure their economic wellbeing. With a rise in terror and conflict, citizens, who 
had most at stake, questioned whether the EU was ensuring their safety and protecting 
their needs. In either case, when the EU citizens were unhappy, insecure, or felt that the 
EU was not performing its duties socially, politically or economically, they blamed the 
EU and trusted the Union less. In short, when citizens’ quality of life was threatened, so 
was their confidence in the EU.  
 
 
Intersections of Political and Economic Legitimacy 
  
Quality of life and its relation to political trust, however, are not quite so clear-cut and 
often incorporate citizens’ personal values and political views. Using the public opinion 
polls from the 2008 Eurobarometer 69, Primozic (2009), found that personal values had 
little to no effect on citizens’ confidence in the EU with the exception of how citizens’ 
viewed democracy and solidarity. In Member States where citizens valued democracy, 
there was more confidence in national institutions. Similarly, member country citizens 
who valued solidarity voiced more trust in the EU than in their national institutions. 
 
When it comes to whether or not the European Union is deemed legitimate, one has to 
consider the individuals or groups in charge. Crespy (2014), in her critical account of the 
need for a reappraisal of conflict in the EU around the issue of democratic legitimacy 
and deliberative democracy8, argued that EU governance is largely elitist and 
technocratic. The operations of the EU are entirely elite-based, reliant upon those who 
hold power, privilege or resources in society. Crespy found that dissenting voices of the 
average citizens were often excluded and undermined the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU polity. In other words, it was the power elite stakeholders that ultimately controlled 
and organized the European Union. She argued that the EU must create a deliberative, 
transparent, and equal democracy [for all to participate in]. By permitting all citizens, but 
especially the average citizen, to channel their views and voice their concerns to the 
EU, they are not only participating in the deliberative decision making process and 
policy output, but are as a consequence, helping create a better quality of life that does 
not benefit only the elite (pp. 82-83). 
 
On balance, the definition of quality of life and economic health in the EU comes down 
to who is defining it: the political and economic elites or the average citizen. The 
                                                          
8
 Deliberative or discursive democracy is a form of democracy in which conflict-based discussion and 
deliberation are central to the decision-making process within the EU (Crespy 2014: 88). 
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average citizen, whose voice is typically dismissed, does not benefit as much from the 
EU economic and political system as the political and economic elites. 
 
 
Citizens’ Working Knowledge of Institutions 
 
Political legitimacy of and citizens’ trust in the EU also comes down to how informed 
and knowledgeable citizens are about the European Union. Karp (2003), in his study of 
cognitive mobilization (citizens’ knowledge), institutional confidence and economic 
benefits of the EU, found that citizens’ lack of knowledge about the EU was one of the 
largest impediments to their evidence based evaluation the EU’s performance. Citizens, 
in the Oct – Nov 1999 Eurobarometer 52.0 survey (a face-to-face survey questionnaire 
of about 30,000 EU citizens), who had a solid understanding of the EU, positively 
evaluated the EU’s success. However, perception of costs and fewer benefits from 
being a part of the EU led to more negative views about the European Union.  
 
Transparency in communication between leading political actors in the governing body 
and EU citizens is essential for creating an informed citizenry. Meyer (1999), in his 
study of political communication in the EU, found that a technocratic mindset and 
associated language, and resultant lack of transparency and poor communication about 
policies and procedures eroded public trust in the legitimacy and success of the EU. For 
example, policy documents shared publicly to encourage transparency and political 
action were “riddled with technocratic jargon and little explanation” (p.629). As a result, 
key issues and policies that may have been of public interest were lost in the complex 
and distorted methods of communication. Consequently, he posited that the European 
Commission failed their duties to achieve democratic legitimacy and public support. 
Meyer concluded that, transparency, as in strong, clear, and direct public 
communication, is vital to the success and political legitimacy of any governing body. 
 
A specific illustration of the legitimacy impediments of opaque communication was seen 
when Central and Eastern Europe were added into the EU beginning in 2004 
(Stefanova 2016). The technocratic jargon language led to euro skepticism. The 
institutional and technical nature and language of the European Union’s expansion into 
Central and Eastern Europe was inadequate to garner public support and confidence in 
the new EU member states. In fact, the political elite and the EU administration 
dismissed the average citizen’s negative views of the EU’s expansion. To the elites, this 
accession as “a major opportunity in political and economic terms” and communicated it 
as so with the public (p.278). But this story of the EU’s expansion resulted in several 
negative consequences for the political legitimacy and citizen trust in the EU. By and 
large, it decreased public support because of negative perceptions of the benefits of EU 
membership and frustration with the lack of transparent communication (281-282). 
Stefanova concluded that the EU administration’s failure to communicate with and 
address the concerns of the average citizen resulted in an unfortunate decline in not 
only the EU’s political legitimacy but also in citizens’ faith in the democratic image of EU 
and its future. 
 
8
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Informed knowledge about the EU also had the power to change citizens’ demands of 
and expectations from the EU administration and related political institutions. Hobolt 
(2012), in her study of the intrinsic relationship between the national governments, EU 
institutions and citizens, concluded that the more knowledgeable citizens were, the 
more they demanded, and expected better quality change and action, from not only 
their national state but also from the EU. Her research found this to be true at all levels, 
personal, national, and EU, in the 2009 27 Members States European Elections Studies 
(EES); “over half [of the citizens] are fairly or very satisfied with how democracy works 
in the EU – slightly more than the proportion of citizens who are satisfied with 
democracy in their own country” (p.100). The more citizens understood how EU 
democracy worked procedurally, the more knowledge-based their opinions on the EU’s 
effectiveness were. There was an immediate sense of public ownership in the 
institutions, regardless of one’s level in society, and a desire to be a part of the decision-
making process, a rather anti-elitist perspective. This perspective was reinforced by 
Sternberg (2013: 80) who argued that there was an inherent need to align integration 
with citizen desires in order for the EU to address the expectations of the citizens and 
achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the EU citizens. In short, citizens’ satisfaction with and 
faith in the EU was not based on a single legitimating factor, but rather citizens’ trust in 
national, state, and EU institutions and their knowledge of the EU itself. 
 
Citizens’ knowledge of major events and crises across Europe and in their home 
nations also shaped their confidence in political institutions such as the EU. The 2009 
EU Debt Crisis for example, not only negatively impacted most European economies 
but has drastically changed public opinion on the economic future and viability of the 
European Union. Corbu (2013), who used interviews with eleven economic experts and 
a national survey of about 1002 citizens in Romania, concluded that citizens with little to 
no knowledge of the EU and current events across Europe were more likely to use 
utilitarian criteria, what is most practical and attractive to them personally, to evaluate 
the EU and its legitimacy post-Euro crisis. Most of Corbu’s respondents felt more 
optimistic about the EU’s future than the future of Romania or of their personal 
situations. On balance, Corbu asserted that major crisis, such as the Euro Crisis, did not 
drastically diminish European citizens’ confidence in the EU; in fact, the majority 
believed that the EU would be able to turn things around, even if not immediately. 
 
On balance, knowledgeable citizens have the power to drastically change public opinion 
about the viability of the European Union, at the member nation and the citizen levels. 
Trust in the European Union seemed to be centered on knowledgeable citizens, their 
informed demands and expectations of the EU, as well as their sense of public 
ownership in the performance and success of national and broader public institutions.  
 
 
State of Scholarly Knowledge about EU Legitimacy   
 
It is evident that at the heart of citizens’ confidence in the European Union is how 
politically and economically legitimate their citizens saw the organization as well as how 
informed and educated they were about EU policies and EU history. While the research 
9
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linking citizens’ trust in the EU system to their knowledge of political institutions and 
quality of life was illuminating, their conclusions were conflicting. For example, 
Haartveld (2013) and Arnold (2012) found that citizens’ trust in the national institutions 
were positively associated with their faith in EU’s political legitimacy while Munoz, 
Torcal, and Bonet (2011) and Kumlin (2009) discovered a negative relationship between 
citizens’ confidence in national and EU-wide institutions. Likewise, the logic of 
extrapolation from Harteveld (2013) were contradictory. Primovic (2009) and Arnold’s 
(2012) work on quality of life and economic health also proved incongruous. Despite 
these mixed results, there is general agreement that everything boils down to trust, the 
backbone of society, which is vital to ensuring successful democracy. And that informed 
citizenry had more confidence in both their national institutions and the EU, compared to 
their less informed counterparts.  
 
The research presented in this paper, attempted to reconcile some of these 
contradictions by comparatively assessing the impact of knowledge and economic 
health on citizen confidence in the EU. Moreover, it relied on the most recent data 
available from the Eurobarometer survey. These updated findings will be useful to the 
EU administration as they work on re-examining their policies and reforms to garner 
more public support and trust. 
 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
This study explored citizens’ confidence in the future of the European Union to 
understand the roles that its stakeholders, the elites and average citizens, might play in 
shaping it future. More specifically, how might EU citizens’ confidence in the EU and in 
the organization’s future, be shaped by citizens’ knowledge of the EU and/or their 
economic health? Answers to these questions can offer clues into whether the political 
legitimacy of the EU will be defined by the political elite, the average citizen, or both. 
Regional differences were also examined to assess how confidence in the EU and its 
political legitimacy might vary depending on the regional context. Content analyses of 
sample current events and regional news about the political elite and the average 
citizen were used to illustrate the regional differences in the Eurobarometer survey 
findings. The formal research question posed was, “How do informed EU citizenry and 
economic health impact their confidence in the European Union?”   
 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
Trust in social institutions is a vital component to the success or failure of major 
institutions and democracies. Organizations that enjoy a large degree of public support 
and trust tend to also have more political legitimacy thereby making them more effective 
and valuable to its members. But, how do organizations build trust in their 
effectiveness? And is trust in organizational effectiveness widely shared across the 
10
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society? Or is trust the prerogative of the elite and not the masses? This study, which 
evaluated the relative roles of informed citizenry and their quality of life on citizens’ 
confidence in the EU, tested these alternative perspectives on organizational efficiency. 
 
Parsons’ Structural Functionalism (Parsons 1975; Powers 2010) is theoretically useful 
in explaining organizational effectiveness and trust from the average EU citizens’ 
perspective; organizations are most effective when the average citizen is involved. On 
the other hand, theories of political and power elites (Domhoff 2005; Gilens 2014) offer 
a counter perspective: effective organizations meet the needs of and are determined by 
the elites and not so much the average citizen. In other words, there will be a direct 
relationship between what the elites want and need, and what the organization 
accomplishes, leaving the average citizen out of the equation (Hage & Dewar 1973). 
 
Irrespective of whether organizations serve the elites or the average citizen, how is 
organizational efficiency achieved? Applied to the EU, an argument can be made that in 
order for EU citizens’ to have confidence, the Union needs to be efficient. According to 
the Principle of Organizational Efficiency (Powers 2010), long-term organizational 
efficiency and effectiveness is a positive function of (a) success in maintaining uniform 
mission awareness and accurate institutional history, (b) depth of commitment to 
minimizing repetition of past mistakes and taking other steps to improve performance, 
(c) organizational capacity for assessing challenges and instituting change without 
interrupting normal operations, and (d) adequacy of alignment of training, information, 
resources, and operational authority with the tasks people are called on to perform in 
their roles (Powers 2010: 173). Stated from an EU standpoint, its administration will find 
ways to maintain organizational effectiveness in order to garner citizens’ support and 
confidence. But whose support and confidence is the EU trying to gain and keep? Is it 
the power elites or the average citizens? 
 
 
Model of Systemic Coupling 
 
The European Union’s organizational efficiency, seen from a Systemic Coupling 
perspective within a Structural Functionalist worldview, would posit that, other things 
being equal, the ability of an organization to maintain its mission focus is a positive 
function of tight systemic coupling. In other words, an effective organization will maintain 
(a) a stable shared awareness of common ends, (b) open and honest lines of 
communication (c) effective allocation of resources with mission involvement, and (e) 
have people at different locations within the system with a sense of common fate 
(Powers 2010: 165). A weakly coupled system, in contrast, is a function of individuals or 
structures in society becoming autonomous and independent units from one another.  
 
Applied to the research question at hand, the European Union will be evaluated by its 
citizens as doing its job poorly by citizens who have limited knowledge of EU goals and 
policies. To the extent that the EU does not maintain transparency and fails to build and 
promote stable awareness and knowledge of the Union’s purpose or policies to its 
citizens, the whole system will be deemed to be not only weakly coupled but also not 
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faithful to its values of peace, stability and prosperity for all EU citizens (Europa, 2016). 
In other words, the more knowledge and understanding provided by the EU to the 
average citizen, and the more transparent the organization’s purpose, policies, and 
functioning, the more likely the average citizen is to have confidence in the EU as a 
legitimate political institution. If citizens do not think that the performance of the Union is 
efficient and effective, then the system will have to change to ensure the needs of the 
people are better met, their trust is kept, and their citizens feel like they are being well 
cared for. In other words, as captured by the Form Follows Function principle of 
Structural Functionalism (Powers 2010: 153), widespread patterns of structural change 
emerge as systemic responses to meet new needs or correct for poor performance in 
the face of old and emerging needs.  
 
Following these theoretical lines of reasoning, it was predicted that Informed Citizenry 
will have a stronger positive influence, than citizens’ Economic Health, on members’ 
Confidence in the European Union, net of EU regions and demographics (Hypothesis 
1). The more working knowledge and understanding the average citizen has about the 
EU (Informed Citizenry) and its benefits to them, the more likely they will be to endorse 
the political legitimacy of the EU and view its future positively. 
 
 
Theory of the Power Elite  
 
On the contrary, it could be argued that it is not the average citizen but rather the power 
elite that control the EU’s future. In a power elite organizational model, the elite not only 
control and protect the most important power sources of society, they also have the 
resources to interject their interests and will into the mainstream societal structures and 
institutions (Lopez 2013: pp. 1-3). To paraphrase George William Domhoff (2005), it is 
the power elites, with their resources and power to influence the makeup of the 
institutional structures and policies that benefit most from public institutions. They 
ensure that the system is set up in a way that prioritizes, privileges, and perpetuates 
their needs and interests over that of the average citizen.  
 
In a political elite framework, it stands to reason that the power elites will be more likely 
to perceive the system as politically legitimate, trustworthy, and successful because 
their interests are protected and served (Gilens 2014). The average citizen who does 
not benefit as much, be it economically, politically, or socially, from the system will not 
be as confident about the future of the EU, likely blame the power elite for their 
misgivings, and question the EU’s political legitimacy. Stated differently, the power elite 
who control and benefit from the system will be likely to accept the political legitimacy 
and have more confidence in the EU’s future. In contrast, the average citizen might be 
more critical and negative of the EU. Following this power elite model, it was predicted 
(Hypothesis 2) that Economic Health of its citizens and nations will have stronger 
positive impact on citizens’ confidence in the EU than Informed Citizenry, net of 
background characteristics of the citizens. 
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCE 
 
A mixed methods approach was used to test the competing perspectives of the power 
elite and the average citizen models on the EU’s future. Secondary data from the 2009 
Eurobarometer survey questionnaire were central to testing the hypotheses. Results 
from the survey analyses were elaborated on with the perspectives of professionals 
knowledgeable about the European Union and content analyses of journalistic reports of 
the British Referendum, the EU debt crisis, the immigration crisis, and the rise in 
terrorism. The professionals who were interviewed provided on-the-ground illustrations 
of stakeholders who control the political legitimacy and the future of the EU. The sample 
case studies of current events and regional news addressed the perspectives of the 
political elite, of the average citizen, or sometimes both. 
 
 
Secondary Survey Data 
 
The “Eurobarometer 72.4: Globalization, Financial and Economic Crisis, Social Change 
and Values, EU Policies and Decision Making, and Global Challenges”9, a cross-
national and cross-temporal interview questionnaire conducted on behalf of the 
European Commission was the source of the quantitative data for this paper. These 
surveys, based on a multistage, national probability sample of citizens from EU member 
states monitor public opinion in European Union member states. Opinions about the 
performance of the EU, various EU policies, economic recovery, responses to global 
threats, and basic demographical data are ascertained. The questionnaire interviews 
were conducted in English and French between October 23, 2009 and November 18, 
2009 with 30,238 citizens in the 27 countries of the European Union10. 
 
Because each EU nation and region has its own experiences and historical context, the 
analyses were disaggregated by major EU regions: Western (40.5%) and Eastern 
(41.0%) regions were represented more in the EU survey sample than the 
Mediterranean region (18.5%). The disproportionate regional representation was partly 
because both Western and Eastern regions are larger in terms of the number of 
countries it encompasses than the Mediterranean (Appendix A). As for citizen sample 
demographics, there was a fairly even split between male (46.5%) and female (53.5%) 
respondents. The sample was also evenly distributed across the six different age 
groups; the largest group was 55 – 64 years old (26.7%). These background 
characteristics and demographics amongst other quality of life factors (Corbu, 2013) 
have been shown to make a difference in how EU citizens thought about the future of 
the EU. Hence, they will be controlled for in the multivariate analyses. 
 
 
  
                                                          
9
 Will be referred to as Eurobarometer 72.4 in the remainder of the paper. 
10
 The original collector of the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for 
use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.  
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Qualitative Methodology 
 
In keeping with a mixed methods design, the statistical analyses of the Eurobarometer 
survey were supplemented with content analyses of current events and regional news 
as well as two qualitative interviews. The two interviewees were professionals, from 
European Union member nations. Both were female ambassadors and officers, 
respectively for NATO and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the EU. They 
were asked a series of questions via email about their thoughts on how EU citizens’ 
confidence in the future of the EU is impacted by informed citizenry and their economic 
health. Refer to Appendix B for the consent form and the interview protocol. 
 
Current events analyzed for this research included journalistic reports of major current 
issues such as the widespread migrant crisis, the British Referendum, the EU Debt 
Crisis, and the rise in terrorist attacks in Western Europe. These reports not only 
supplemented the quantitative EU regional differences and interviewee comments, but 
also updated the 2009 Eurobarometer findings. These current events also had the 
potential to shape EU citizens’ confidence in the EU and its future. 
 
 
DATA ANALYSES 
 
Three levels of statistical data analysis were used to examine and answer the research. 
The descriptive analyses, which drew a portrait of the EU sample, aided in setting the 
context for further explorations into the research question at hand. The preliminary 
glimpses into the roles of informed citizenry and their economic health in their 
confidence in the EU’s legitimacy and future, offered in the bivariate analyses, were 
retested using multivariate regression analyses. It was in the multivariate analyses that 
the net comparative strengths of informed citizens versus their economic health in 
shaping citizen confidence in the EU were identified. A comparative regional analysis 
was also conducted and explicated with content analyses of regional current events. 
 
 
Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis 
 
On balance, most EU respondents trusted the EU, even if they disagreed with certain 
policies or projects the Union has undertaken. Citizens also had elementary knowledge 
about the EU but did not know how the organization functions or which nations are 
members. Lastly, the economic and personal wealth of the EU citizens was in the 
middle class range; their economic wellbeing was not polarized at either end of the 
economic spectrum. 
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Confidence in the EU 
 
As the EU has been continuously hit with one crisis after another, confidence of their 
citizens continues to be a concern for the EU administration. Citizen views on both the 
strengths of the EU and its challenges were measured (Table 1.A.)11. 
 
From the citizens’ perspectives, the strengths of the EU lay in its positive future 
directions, its membership status, and overall satisfaction with the EU. Citizen 
respondents were more likely (58.6%) than not, to trust the EU, its Council (the main EU 
decision-making body, at 61.0%), and to be optimistic about the future of the EU 
(71.4%). On balance, EU citizens felt that the EU was fairly strong and successful in its 
mission; the average score on the EU strength index was 28.64 on a scale of 7.0 to 
43.0 (Appendix C, Table 1.A.A.). 
 
However, there was some reticence hesitance in the full-throated endorsement of the 
EU; the hesitation became clearer when looking at the citizens’ opinions on the 
system’s weaknesses (Appendix C, Table 1.A.B.). Some of the prominent complaints 
were that the EU had grown too rapidly (67.5%) and were short of ideas and projects (at 
the time of the survey, at 54.5%). As summarized by the cumulative index mean of 5.45 
(on an index range from 2.0 – 8.0), EU respondents tended to be somewhat neutral, 
even slightly negative, when talking about the weaknesses of the EU system. 
 
Table 1.A. Confidence in the EU  
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
Concept Dimensions Values Statistics 
Total 
Sample 
(n = 13797) 
Western 
Europe 
(n=5819) 
Eastern 
Europe 
(n=5090) 
Mediterranean 
 
(n=2374) 
Confidence 
in the EU 
 
EU Strengths Mean 
(SD) 
Min–Max 
28.64 
(6.09) 
7.0–43.0 
27.91 
(6.47) 
7.0 – 43.0 
29.0 
(5.80) 
9.0 – 43.0 
29.41
*** 
(5.82) 
10.0 – 43.0 
 
 EU 
Weaknesses 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – Max 
5.45 
(1.38) 
2.0 – 8.0 
5.58 
(1.39) 
2.0 – 8.0 
5.21 
(1.37) 
2.0 – 8.0 
5.70
***
 
(1.33) 
2.0 – 8.0 
 Index of 
Confidence 
in the EU
1
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – Max  
34.1 
(5.77) 
12.0 – 49.0 
33.45 
(6.03) 
12.0 – 48.0 
34.21 
(5.45) 
15.0 – 48.0 
35.12
***
 
(5.77) 
15.0 – 49.0 
   1 
Index of Confidence in the EU = Sub-Index of EU Strengths + Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses. Possible range: 12.0-  
    49.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .06
***
 to .49
***
 at .000 significance level. 
 
 
Overall, as of 2009, the average EU respondent lay somewhere in the middle, neither 
too confident nor too insecure in their faith and confidence in the European Union’s 
                                                          
11
 A factor analysis of the confidence in the EU questions revealed two dimensions in the confidence 
index: one set highlighted the strengths of the EU while the second captured the EU’s weaknesses. 
Therefore, the analyses were also split along these two dimensions when appropriate. 
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future; the overall confidence index mean was 34.1 on a range from 12.0 to 49.0. 
Interestingly, Mediterranean and Eastern European nation citizens were slightly more 
confident in the EU than their Western European counterparts. 
 
It is not surprising that the moderate confidence recorded in the 2009 Eurobarometer 
survey has been further shaken by a number of tragic events that recently hit the EU 
member nations. Among these unfortunate events is the recent rise in the terrorist 
attacks, particularly in Western Europe. Britain, France, Turkey, Norway, Belgium, and 
Germany, have all faced terrorist attacks that have shattered the confidence and faith of 
citizens across the EU (Peek 2016). The physical damage caused by these horrific 
events was easy to see, the number of injured and dead was easy to count and to 
mourn, But, the fears and loss of confidence that many citizens experienced was even 
more poignant than the physical damages (Hope, Foster, Hughes 2016).  
 
Dozens of journalists also hypothesized that each of these attacks were not about 
targeting a specific group of people or nation but rather the European Union as a whole 
(Pearce & Chad 2016), a perspective endorsed by EU leaders. As the European 
Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, following the devastating Brussels airport 
attack, stated, “these attacks have hit Brussels today, and Paris yesterday, but it is 
Europe as a whole that has been targeted” (Pearce & Chad 2016). Similar waves of 
attacks that occurred in France in the year prior to the Brussels bombing, and more 
recently the lorry truck attacks in Nice and Berlin, to name a few, have brought to the 
forefront questions about the open borders across Europe and consequent vulnerability 
of Member States (Peek 2016). Some Eurosceptic European leaders, such as George 
Eustice, capitalized on these fears of vulnerability to stoke citizens’ distrust in their 
national governments and the governance of the EU (Hope, et al. 2016). Hope and his 
colleagues endorsed the rationale offered by Minister Eustice, a pioneer for border 
controls within the EU, that having stronger borders within the EU would allow national 
governments to protect their citizens from terrorism. In other words, using the influx of 
refugees and terrorist attacks in Western Europe to incite panic and fear, the media and 
political-economic leaders alike stoked distrust in the EU and its legitimate ability to 
serve and protect its citizens. 
 
No doubt, there is no population in the world that is completely exempt from any sort of 
major atrocities, no matter how prepared and safe a city or region is. This being said, if 
the leadership of a particular nation or larger governing body like the EU is not able to 
meet the needs of its citizens and protect them from these horrific, large-scale acts of 
violence, then the average citizen will not only dismiss the legitimacy and success of the 
EU but also have little to no trust in the system. Under these challenging circumstances, 
citizens are more likely, than not, to vote to change their leaders and the political regime 
in its entirety (Peek 2016). Although this has yet to occur on a grand scale across the 
European Union, similar movements and structural changes have been witnessed 
around the world. A most notable example is the Arab Spring, which occurred less than 
a decade ago. What began with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a lower-
class Tunisian street vendor, quickly spread like wildfire across the Middle East and 
North Africa resulting in episodes of unrest, disruptive activism, and the eventual 
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overthrowing of political leaders such as Mubarak [Egypt], Ben Ali [Tunisia], and Qadaffi 
[Libya] (Alimi & Meyer 2011). Because these authoritarian regimes dismissed and 
ignored the needs of average citizens and failed to protect all citizens, many decided to 
successfully fight back. 
 
Added to the terrorist attacks and the ensuing political and economic turmoil, was the 
migrant or refugee crisis, which shook up the EU regions even more. The growing 
turmoil and civil unrest in the Middle East, which reached a peak in 2014, led to more 
than a million migrants, predominantly through Southeast Europe and the 
Mediterranean Sea, to come into the European Union, in search of a better life (BBC 
2016). According to The Telegraph, a British newspaper, as of November 2015, more 
than 1 million refugees and migrants had illegally arrived in Europe; one in 22 of the 
migrants were deemed to be refugees by the UN refugee agency (Holehouse & Smith 
2016). The count of refugees has been estimated to have grown even more and is 
believed to have reached record levels in 2017, as per the President of the European 
Union Council (Williams 2017). 
 
The surge of refugees, along with other economic crises that the Union already faced, 
created a perfect storm of events that worsened the political turmoil in the continent. 
The refugee crisis occurred as the EU continent was attempting to recover from the 
debt and related economic disasters (The Economist 2016). The European Institute 
(European Affairs) noted that the EU debt crisis has “heightened anti-immigrant 
feelings” across the EU, amongst average citizens and political elites alike. This has 
resulted in a series of political crisis, not only about the internal and external EU border 
controls but also whether or not the EU administration is doing enough to protect its 
Member States and their EU citizens. Furthermore, political tensions in the EU have 
been steadily rising due to the disproportionate burden faced by the more economically 
sturdy member countries which must then care for the less economically stable nations 
in the Mediterranean and Eastern European regions. Making matters worse is the fact 
that EU Member States with weaker economies such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary, 
among other Eastern and Mediterranean EU nations have received the majority of 
migrants (BBC 2016; European Institute 2017).  
 
Besides, many Western European and some Eastern European political leaders have 
argued that opening borders to migrants puts the lives of European citizens at risk and 
destabilizes the EU system in place (Hope et al. 2016). The polarized political 
sentiments around the migrant crisis created further rifts amongst EU Member States 
and with the EU because the discussions around the crisis have failed to incorporate all 
stakeholders involved. The typical complaints were that the EU was taking into 
consideration only the perspectives of the elites and the more powerful EU Member 
States, and did not acknowledge and incorporate the voices of the average citizens and 
nations being affected first hand. The average citizens’ growing concerns and distrust 
were a consequence of the clashes in voiced perspectives, or a lack there of, between 
the political elite and the average citizen. 
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The upcoming decades certainly promise to be pivotal to the future of the European 
Union and its political legitimacy. With the French elections coming up this spring, 
Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen looks to take power, return the French franc and hold a 
French referendum on EU membership (Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). Meanwhile, the British 
Prime Minister has formally begun the process of leaving the EU. In the Netherlands, 
Geert Wilders, a radical populist who was also calling for a vote to leave the EU and the 
“de-Islamization” of the Netherlands failed to win the elections but still managed to gain 
some seats (Deacon 2016; Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). Germany gears up for election sin 
the fall and Italy in early 2018, both of whom have political parties calling for 
referendums on their respective country’s EU membership (The Economist 2017). As 
Mcdonald-Gibson (2017) stated in a recent Time article, “While populists [like Wilders 
and Le Pen] are creating new visions for the future, traditional European powers are 
scrambling to uphold the lofty ideals of the past. If they can’t find a way to fit in with the 
new world order [and re-instill confidence in its citizens], they might not have much of a 
future at all.” 
 
 
Informed Citizenry 
 
One mechanism to improve citizens’ confidence in the European Union and their views 
on EU political legitimacy is through improving their knowledge and understanding of 
the EU structures, its history, and its policies. The concept of Informed Citizenry (Table 
1.B) and its component indicators offered a generalized view of how educated citizens 
were about the European Union. Citizens’ breadth of knowledge and understanding of 
the EU and the EU administration was represented by both general knowledge of and 
understanding about its purpose as well as EU policies12. 
 
On the face of it, citizens’ general knowledge of the EU remained fairly elementary; they 
knew little about the general purpose of EU organization, it history and functioning 
(Appendix D, Table 1.B.A.). More than half the EU respondents had difficulty answering 
a set of three true or false questions correctly (got question one wrong: 55.6%, got 
question two wrong: 18.1%, got question three wrong 56.1% respectively). With a 
cumulative mean of 3.71 on a knowledge index range of 0.0 – 6.0, it was evident that 
while citizens generally knew what the EU and its council was, they did not have 
general working knowledge of the EU processes and its history. This lack of clear 
understanding of the structure, history, and policies of the EU makes it difficult for 
citizens to offer evidence based judgements of whether the EU is fulfilling its role and to 
endorse the organization or not. Yet, EU citizens were quite positive about the 
effectiveness of EU policies enacted to combat the widespread economic crisis at the 
time of the survey (Appendix D, Table 1.B.B.). More than half the respondents viewed 
the EU policy efforts extremely positively and successful (range of 78% to 82.6%). That 
EU respondents were not very knowledgeable about EU policies but quite content with 
                                                          
12
 Factor analysis of the informed citizenry questions revealed two main dimensions in the informed 
citizenry index: one set highlighted general EU knowledge of history and purpose while the second 
emphasized citizens’ knowledge of EU policies. Therefore, these analyses were also split along these two 
dimensions when appropriate. 
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the success of EU policies was recapped in the cumulative index of policy knowledge 
mean of 12.12 on an index that ranged from 4.0 – 16.0.  
 
Overall, the average EU citizen was fairly informed with reasonable knowledge of the 
EU and its purpose (cumulative index of Informed Citizenry mean was 15.83 on a scale 
from 5.0 to 22.0). Interestingly, EU citizens from the Mediterranean nations were more 
knowledgeable about the EU and its history and policies in contrast to Western 
European citizens who had the least amount of knowledge. The vast majority of 
average citizens felt that they knew the role of the EU but had little to no understanding 
of how it works and the types of policies and work the Union actually does. To quote an 
International Staff Executive Officer for NATO (Interviewee #1), “the average informed 
citizen still understands very little of what is going on due to the vastness and 
complexity of the various institutes. They may have some idea of purpose but not much 
on policies.” In lacking even, the most basic knowledge of the EU and how it works, the 
average citizen is unable to recognize the ways in which the EU is succeeding or failing 
at addressing their specific needs and therefore will likely deem the EU to be slightly 
less legitimate and untrustworthy. 
 
 
Table 1.B. Informed Citizenry 
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
Concept Dimensions  Values  Statistics 
Total 
Sample 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Mediterranean 
Informed 
Citizenry 
Index of 
General 
EU 
Knowledge 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – Max 
(n) 
3.70 
(1.28) 
0.0 – 6.0 
(9176) 
3.72 
(1.30) 
0.0 – 6.0 
(4262) 
3.72 
(1.23) 
0.0 – 6.0 
(3251) 
3.58
***
 
(1.29) 
0.0 – 6.0 
(1319) 
 Index of 
Policy 
Knowledge 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – Max 
(n) 
12.12 
(2.47) 
4.0 – 16.0 
(13015) 
11.78 
(2.51) 
4.0 – 16.0 
(5494) 
12.15 
(2.40) 
4.0 – 16.0 
(4769) 
12.93
***
 
(2.32) 
4.0 – 16.0 
(2271) 
 Index of 
Informed 
Citizenry
1
 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – Max 
(n) 
15.83 
(2.96) 
5.0 – 22.0 
(8832) 
15.57 
(3.01) 
5.0 – 22.0 
(4088) 
15.83 
(2.90) 
5.0 – 22.0 
(3121) 
16.63
***
 
(2.82) 
6.0 – 22.0 
(1290) 
1 
Index of Informed Citizenry = Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge + Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge. 
Possible range: 5.0–22.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .03
***
 to .65
***
 and significant at 
.000 level. 
 
 
The British Referendum (Brexit) in June of 2013 was a perfect example of what can 
occur when citizens’ had poor understanding of the European Union and what EU 
membership entails. The Brexit vote, which had a 71.8% turnout, recorded that 51.9% 
of citizens voted to leave the EU versus 48.1% voting to stay in the EU (Hunt & Wheeler 
2017), left many elites in disbelief. Despite pro-EU urgings from the leaders of the 
largest British political parties, the then Prime Minister David Cameron, major business 
leaders, trade unions, esteemed scientists and economists, and more, about 17.4 
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million British citizens voted to leave the EU (Chu 2016; Hunt & Wheeler 2017). The 
question is why? 
 
In the months following Brexit, much has been written in the journalistic and scholarly 
circles about not only the repercussions of this decision on the average citizen and the 
economic well-being of the United Kingdom, but more importantly that the voters were 
largely uninformed and voted blindly to leave the European Union. British voters were 
quite unaware of even the most elementary political facts and history. Such lack of 
awareness became especially clear when the Google Trends Twitter account reported 
that in the hours after the poll closed, there was a 250 percent increase in people 
searching “what happens if we leave the EU” and “what is Brexit” (Walton 2016). In a 
survey of 1,00 people completed by Ipsos MORI, a market research company in the UK 
and Ireland, it was also concluded that British citizens’ perceptions of the British 
government and of the EU was way off from the actual facts and figures (Peck 2016). In 
Peck’s analyses, approximately 15% of British citizens, one in seven, were reported to 
believe in at least one Euro-myth, an exaggerated or invented story about nonsensical 
EU legislation or EU bodies (also, Wikipedia 2016). These inaccuracies and 
misunderstandings of the political systems in place and lack of awareness of the 
potential policy changes resulted in a major change not only for the UK but also for the 
entire European Union (Friedman 2016). 
 
Some journalists placed the onus for the high levels of public ignorance on the media 
and the British politicians. On the other hand, others have posited that the Brexit vote 
goes beyond a simple lack of knowledge and actually has to do with the cultural, 
economic, and political divides in the country. Ben Chu (2016), The Independent’s 
Economics Editor and its previous chief lead writer, argued that “the crude majoritarian 
politics of this referendum has seen half of the population, a generally poorer, less well-
educated and elderly half, effectively strip major freedoms and even a cherished identity 
from the other half, a more prosperous and predominantly younger half.” In either event, 
the average citizens, who barely had a rudimentary sense of the pros and cons of 
Brexit, voted to leave the UK (Friedman 2016). Ironically, the average poorly informed 
Brexit voter voted against his or her own economic interests; they were also the 
economically marginalized in the country (Economic Health). Brexit is the ultimate proof 
of the political and economic turmoil that an uninformed voting citizenry can unleash 
and perhaps explain why (in Table 1B), Western European respondents were slightly 
less informed than their Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean counterparts. 
 
 
Economic Elites and Their Wellbeing 
 
While it has been argued that an average citizen has the ability to shape the perceived 
legitimacy and success of the EU, it is important to also recognize the power that the 
elites have in controlling the dominant view of the EU.  
 
Economic Elites, and their economic standing, was examined by the economic success 
and wellbeing of EU citizens at two levels: (1) the individual level (Appendix E, Table 
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1.C.A.) and (2) the national level (Appendix E, Table 1.C.B.)13. Citizens from Western 
European nations were much better in personal and national economic health than their 
Eastern and Mediterranean counterparts. Western European citizens had a better 
quality of life and economic well-being, reflected in the economic index mean of 42.93 
on a scale of 19.0 – 60.0. EU citizens from Eastern European and Mediterranean 
nations had about the same level of personal economic wealth but differed when it 
came to their nation’s economic health; Eastern European citizens had a slightly higher 
national index mean (19.41) than their Mediterranean counterparts (18.76). 
 
On a personal economic health level, the majority of the EU participants rated 
themselves as a part of the middle class of society, Boxes 4 – 7 on a scale of 1 to 10 
(77.3%). From the citizens’ perspective, their personal economic health lay in their 
economic standing within society as well as their satisfaction with their personal 
economic and financial situations. Citizen respondents were quite positive when asked 
about their lives; three quarters of citizens felt fairly, if not very satisfied with their lives 
(73.4%), and just over half judged their personal job (62.4%) and financial situations 
(60.9%) as good or very good. All things considered, while EU citizens’ personal 
economic and financial health was neither good nor bad, they were comfortable with 
their economic status (personal health index mean was 21.5 on a scale of 7.0 – 34.0). 
 
Table 1.C. Economic Elites and Their Health 
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4  
Concepts Dimensions Values  Statistics 
Total 
Sample 
Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Mediterranean 
Economic 
Elites and 
Their 
Health  
Personal 
Economic 
Health 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – Max 
(n) 
21.5 
(4.42) 
7.0 – 34.0 
(10756) 
22.66 
(4.25) 
7.0 – 34.0 
(4631) 
20.54 
(4.53) 
7.0 – 34.0 
(3851) 
20.88
***
 
(4.06) 
7.0 – 33.0 
(1856) 
  
National 
Economic 
Health 
 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – Max 
(n) 
 
19.54 
(3.58) 
9.0 – 30.0 
(10971) 
 
20.05 
(3.60) 
9.0 – 30.0 
(4715) 
 
19.41 
(3.43) 
9.0 – 30.0 
(4008) 
 
18.76
***
 
(3.57) 
9.0 – 28.0 
(1863) 
 Index of 
Economic 
Health
1
 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min – Max 
(n) 
41.18 
(6.39) 
17.0 – 60.0 
(8788) 
42.93 
(6.18) 
19.0 – 60.0 
(3866) 
40.06 
(6.35) 
18.0 – 60.0 
(3125) 
39.42
***
 
(6.0) 
17.0 – 57.0 
(1480) 
1 
Index of Economic Health = Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health + Sub-Index of National Economic 
Health. Possible range: 17.0 – 60.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .05
***
 to .07
***
 and 
significant at .000 level. 
 
 
Although the EU Debt Crisis was only just beginning at the time of the survey, it is 
evident that the economic state at the national level was also important to EU citizens. 
                                                          
13
 Factor analysis of the economic health questions revealed two main dimensions in index economic 
health: one set reflected the personal economic and financial well-being of EU citizens while the second 
highlighted the national economic well-being and health EU member states. Therefore, the analyses were 
also split along these two dimensions when appropriate. 
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There was concern and negative sentiments from EU citizens when discussing the 
current state of their national and EU economies (Appendix E, Table 1.C.B.). The 
dominant view was that the national economy was doing rather badly or very badly 
(75%), as was their assessment of the European economy in general (63.6%). This 
being said, approximately half or more than half of EU citizens felt that the European 
economy was performing better or much better than other leading world economies 
such as the Chinese, the American, the Russian, and the Indian. As summarized by the 
cumulative mean of 19.54 on the index of national health which ranged from of 9.0 to 
30.0, EU citizens tended to deem the health of the national and European economies as 
decent enough to get by, neither good nor bad. 
 
Much has been written in the journalistic circles that the economic problems facing the 
European Union today go back to the global financial meltdown and euro-zone crisis of 
2009 (Featherstone 2012; Mason 2016; Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). The EU Debt Crisis 
largely began taking its toll on nations across Europe in the final months of 2009, 
exposing not only the economic rifts between the rich Northern and Western European 
nations and the poorer South but also the “stagnant growth, high unemployment and 
public anger in member states of, say, Italy, Greece, and Spain,” nations of the 
Mediterranean EU region (Mcdonald-Gibson 2017). Despite the stabilization of the euro 
zone, the growth rates are still incredibly low for citizens in the Mediterranean and 
Eastern European regions (The Economist 2017). Moreover, unemployment rates 
continue to remain high and the European Central Bank (ECB) has become 
overwhelmed by the number of loans they have had to give out to nations across all of 
Europe (The Economist 2017). 
 
Lord Howard, the former Tory leader, said: “The European Union, in its current form, is 
a flawed and failing project which is making many of its inhabitants poorer than they 
should or need be and is failing to keep its people safe. The first is a consequence of 
the euro, which has an exchange rate far too high for the crippled economies of 
southern Europe, though, because it is lower than the deutschmark would have been, 
helps to make Germany’s exports competitive. The second is a consequence of the 
Schengen agreement which, according to the former Head of Interpol ‘is like hanging a 
sign welcoming terrorists to Europe’” (Hope et al. 2016). Despite years of attempted 
austerity and severe economic reforms, many nations are still drowning in debts larger 
than that their economic output (Mason 2016; Kirk 2017). While the Western EU nations 
continued to flourish, many Mediterranean and Eastern EU nations floundered, causing 
even greater division between the elitist and the average nations (Mason 2016). 
 
 
Summary 
 
Several conclusions are worth noting in the descriptive portrayal of EU citizens outlined 
above. (1) Most EU citizens positively viewed and trusted the European Union and its 
political legitimacy. Eastern and Mediterranean citizens were slightly more confident in 
the EU than their Western counterparts. (2) Although respondents did not understand 
either how the EU functions or what nations make up the member states, many were 
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able to identify some of the EU’s policies and their effectiveness. In this regard too, EU 
citizens’ from the Mediterranean had slightly more knowledgeable than their Western 
and Eastern counterparts. (3) As for their economic wellbeing, a majority of EU 
respondents were satisfied with their personal financial wellbeing, despite the 
stagnation in, or even worsening of their nation’s economic situation. Yet, citizens felt 
that the national and European economies were doing well in comparison to other 
nations and regions of the world. 
 
 
Bivariate Analyses 
 
To test for preliminary empirical relationships of Informed Citizenry and Their Economic 
Health with citizens’ confidence in the future of the European Union, bivariate analyses 
were conducted. The preliminary correlations (Table 2 in Appendix F) indicated multiple 
strands in the potential strengths of informed citizenry and their economic health in 
shaping the future of the EU. 
 
As might be expected, the more informed the citizens were and the better their 
economic health, the more confidence they had in the EU. However, EU citizens were 
much more likely to trust the EU (r = .53***) when they were informed than when they 
were satisfied with their economic wellbeing was healthy (r = .34***).  
 
While not as strong as the knowledgeable citizenry and their economic health 
correlations, demographic factors were also related to EU confidence. Females (r = -
.04*) and older EU citizens (-.07**) were slightly less confident than their male and 
younger counterparts respectively. Citizens from Mediterranean EU nations (r = .08**) 
had a bit more confidence in the EU and in its EU’s future than their Western European 
counterparts (r = -.09***). Mediterranean nation citizens were also faintly more informed 
and knowledgeable about the EU than citizens from Western European nations 
(Mediterranean: r = .11***; Western: r = -.08**). On the other hand, the economic health 
of Western EU nations and their citizens (r = .24***) was twice as strong and healthy 
than their Eastern (r = -.13***) and Mediterranean (r = -.12***) counterparts. The 
robustness of the comparative net (of sex, age, and EU regions) influences of informed 
citizenry and their economic health on their confidence in the EU will be tested in the 
multivariate analyses presented in the subsequent section. 
 
 
Multivariate Regression Analyses 
 
In the final analytical step, multivariate regression analyses were used to test the 
hypotheses about the net effects of Informed Citizenry and Their Economic Health on 
Confidence in the EU; sex, age, and EU regions were controlled. The analyses were 
also disaggregated by the three EU regions: Western, Eastern, and Mediterranean.  
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Table 3. Regression Analyses of the Net Relative Impacts of Informed Citizenry and Economic 
Health on Confidence in the European Union; Beta (β) Coefficients, 2009 Eurobarometer 72.4  
 Confidence in the EU
1 
Beta (β) 
Confidence in the EU1 
EU Strengths2 EU Weaknesses3 
Informed Citizenry4 .45
***
  .45
***
  -.11
***
  
 General EU 
Knowledge5 
 .24
***
  .26
***
  -.12
**
 
 Policy Knowledge6  .34
***
  .34
***
  -.05
**
 
Economic Elites & Health7 .25
***
  .28
***
  -.19
***
  
  Personal Economic 
Health8 
 .17
***
  .19
***
  -.11
***
 
 National Economic 
Health9 
 .14
***
  .16
***
  -.12
***
 
Age10 -.03
*
 -.03
*
 .02
*
 .03
*
 
Sex11 .00 .00 .00 -.00 
Western Europe12 -.23
***
  -.22
***
 -.21
***
 -.03
*
 -.04
*
 
Eastern Europe12 -.15
*** 
 -.11
***
 -.10
***
 -.15
***
 -.16
***
 
Model Statistics: 
Constant 
 
13.98 
 
14.18 
 
5.92 
 
6.16 
 
8.06 
 
8.02 
Adjusted R
2
 .33
***
 .33
***
 .35
***
 .36
***
 .08
***
 .09
***
 
DF 1 & 2 7 & 6275 9 & 6273 7 & 6275 9 & 6273 7 & 6275 9 & 6273 
1
 Index of Confidence in the EU = Sub-Index of EU Strengths + Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses; range = 12.0 (low  
  confidence) – 49.0 (high confidence).
 
2
 Sub-Index of EU Strengths: Range of 7.0 (fairly weak/not strong) – 43.0 (very strong/very confident). See  
 Appendix C Table 1.A.A for index components.
 
3
 Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses: Range: 2.0 (not weak) – 8.0 (very  weak/poor confidence). See  
  Appendix C. Table 1.A.B for index components.
 
4
 Index of Informed Citizenry = Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge + Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge; range =  
 5.0 (no knowledge, uninformed) – 22.0 (knowledgeable, well informed). 
 
5
 Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge: Range of 0.0 (no EU knowledge) – 6.0 (solid EU knowledge). See  
 Appendix D. Table 1.B.A for index components.
 
6
 Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge: Range of 4.0 (little/poor policy knowledge)-16. (good/strong policy knowledge). 
 See Appendix D. Table 1.B.B for index components.
 
 7
 Index of Economic Elites, their Health: Sub-index of Personal Economic Health + Sub-Index of National 
   
 Economic Health; Range of 17 (low/poor economic health)–60 (good/strong health). 
 
8
 Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health: Range = 7 (poor personal economic health)–34 (strong personal 
   economic health). See Appendix D. Table 1.C.A for index components. 
 
9
 Sub-Index of National Economic Health: Range of 9.0 (poor national economic health)–30.0 (strong personal 
   economic health). See Appendix D. Table 1.C.B for index components. 
10
 Age: 1 = 15 – 24yrs, 2 = 25 – 34yrs, 3 = 35 – 44yrs, 4 = 45 – 54yrs, 5 = 55 – 64yrs, 6 = 65yrs and older 
11
 Sex: 0 = Male, 1 = Female; 
12
 EU Regions: reference group is the other two regions. 
***
<=p .001; *p<=.05. 
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As was predicted from a Systemic Coupling framework, the more knowledgeable the 
average citizens were about the EU, its history and policies, the more confident and 
trusting they were of the EU (Beta = .45***). While economic health also improved 
citizens’ confidence in the EU, its impact was substantially smaller than how informed 
citizens were, by approximately two times (Beta = .25***). Additionally, citizens from 
Western Europe were least confident in the European Union (Beta = -.23***), followed by 
Eastern Europe (-.15***); ergo, of the three regions, Mediterranean citizens were the 
most confident. Male and female EU citizens did not differ in their confidence. Even 
though older respondents (Beta = -.03**) trusted the EU and its institutions less than 
their younger counterparts, the difference was minor.  
 
The robustness of how knowledgeable citizens and economic elites shaped confidence 
in the EU was also verified in that these patterns did not differ across the three EU 
regions. Besides, irrespective of whether citizens’ knowledge or economic wellbeing 
were disaggregated by their constituent dimensions, informed citizens overall had a 
greater positive impact on shaping the future of the European Union and its political 
legitimacy, more than the economic elites and their health.  
 
While all members of the uneven economic and political EU felt the impacts of the debt 
crisis, it was those who were hit the hardest that truly viewed the EU negatively because 
they were yet to reap any benefits from the institution (Interviewee #2). Because of this, 
the middle and lower classes of the EU, the average citizen, have less EU confidence 
than their elitist counterparts. The economic elites of society, although were also hit, did 
not experience as much hardship or lose as much of their property and lifestyles as the 
average citizen because they already began with a greater amount of resources and 
privilege, and were only slightly negatively impacted by the crisis. 
 
In a press conference last year, the former president of Poland, Donald Tusk stated, “All 
too often today, the European elites seem to be detached from reality” (Deacon 2016). 
He felt that their lack of interest in the well-being of all citizens of the European Union, 
had the power to not only change the EU agenda and to overlook the needs of the 
average citizen but also was one of the root causes of major events such as the British 
Referendum (Deacon 2016). 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: 
Empirical and Applied 
 
Previous research had shown that both informed citizenry and citizens personal and 
national economic health had huge, but separate, impacts on citizens’ confidence in the 
European Union and its legitimacy. There were however, no comparisons, to date, of 
the respective roles political elites and the average citizen played in shaping thinking 
about EU political legitimacy.  
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Important insights were gained about the strong role that informed citizens played in EU 
political legitimacy. While economic elites were important for politically legitimating the 
EU, their influence was not as important as that of the average citizen. The more 
knowledgeable and educated citizens were, the more likely they were to deem the EU 
as a legitimate political organization. Informed citizens are able to better understand 
whether or not their needs as average citizens are being met and well taken into 
account by their leaders; if they are not, they are able to more easily demand changes 
to be made. As for elites, the more economically healthy they were, the more they 
trusted the EU. Perhaps, unlike the average citizen who does not benefit as much from 
the system economically, politically, or socially, the elites control and benefit the most 
from the system and are more likely to be confident in the EU. The roles of informed 
citizenry versus elites were similar across the EU regions, even though Eastern 
European and the Mediterranean citizens both shared a slightly greater amount of trust 
in the EU than their Western EU counterparts.  
 
These findings can inform the EU administration’s attempts to develop new policies and 
reforms to garner more public support and trust. For example, providing more 
transparent and easily accessible information to the public, about their meetings, their 
policies and their reforms, allows citizens to be more informed about the EU and how it 
benefits them and their home nation. As Donald Tusk, the former president of Poland 
stated, “We must help people to restore faith in the fact that the EU should serve them, 
guarantee their protection and share their emotions” (Deacon 2016). By allowing the 
average citizen’s voice to be heard and listening to and acknowledging their needs, the 
EU can better address the needs of all its citizens and its Member States as opposed to 
simply taking care of the political, economic, and social elites of the Union. Although the 
elites will be major players in the EU and political and economic reforms, it is evident 
that the average citizen yields much more power than the economic and political elites 
when it comes to the legitimacy and the future of the EU. 
 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
While there was support for both theoretical predictions, the set of Systemic Coupling 
and Form Follows Function concepts had more support for understanding EU citizens’ 
confidence in the EU than the theory of power elites. On the one hand, when citizens 
lacked knowledge and awareness of the EU’s purpose, the system and its citizens 
became not only weakly coupled but the EU also failed to achieve its main purposes of 
peace, stability and prosperity for its citizens. On the other, when there was sustained 
shared awareness and knowledge between the EU and EU citizens, the system 
became moderately coupled with citizens. In short, when citizens were fairly informed, 
the EU was able to garner citizens’ trust by maintaining a degree of mission focus and a 
moderately coupled system. 
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Figure 1 
Empirical Model of the Comparative Effects of Informed Citizenry and Economic 
Elites on Confidence in the European Union 1, 2, 3  
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
1
 Refer to Table 3 for index coding;  
2 
In the interest of clarity, the difference in sex (β = .00) was not presented. 
3 
The differences in the effects of sub-indices of Confidence in the EU were minimal. If interested,  
   please contact the researcher. 
 
 
Class-consciousness of power elites also shaped confidence in the EU but was not as 
influential as hypothesized by the Power Elite model. It is true that the more satisfied 
and economically healthy citizens were with their lives, the more confident they were in 
the EU and its institutions; yet the elites were not as impactful in influencing overall 
confidence in the EU as the average citizen. To quote the Maritime Affairs Attaché to 
the EU for the Republic of Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(Interviewee #2), “following the economic downturn experienced across the EU in recent 
years, those who were hardest hit and those who have yet to feel any benefits from 
what was already a very uneven economic system, were more likely to view the EU 
negatively.” In other words, the middle and lower classes of the EU, the average citizen, 
unsurprisingly had the least amount of confidence in the EU. The lack of confidence 
 
Confidence in the EU 
(Principle of 
Organizational 
Efficiency) 
EU Regions: 
Western Europe 
β = -.23*** 
Age 
β = -.03** 
EU Regions: 
Eastern Europe 
β = -.15*** 
 
 
 
Economic Elites & Health 
Personal 
Economic Health 
National 
Economic Health 
β = .17*** 
β = .14*** 
β = .25*** 
Informed Citizenry 
General EU 
Knowledge 
Policy 
Knowledge 
β = .24*** 
β = .45*** 
β = .34*** 
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might be because of the economic and social support provided to them by the EU 
and/or their national institutions. The political and economic elite, while also hit, did not 
experience as much hardship as the average citizen. The elites, who had access to 
resources and privilege, felt that they were benefitting from the EU and therefore 
deemed the EU to be more trustworthy and legitimate.  
 
 
Limitations and Suggestions for the Futures 
 
Like most studies, this research was not free of limitations. While valuable insights into 
the dominant role of the average citizen in shaping confidence in the European Union 
were gained, many unresolved questions still remain. For example, the research only 
captured only 36 percent of variability in EU citizens’ confidence in the EU (Adjusted R2 
= .36***). This leaves much about citizens’ EU confidence unexplained and opens up 
possibilities for future research.  
 
From the multivariate analyses, it was clear that by and large, the more informed and 
knowledgeable citizens’ were the more they tended to trust the European Union and the 
EU administration in a broad sense. But, as the NATO Executive Officer (Interviewee # 
1) explained, the European Union is vast and complex in its structural make up of many 
smaller committees and institutions. Citizens and elite confidence will likely vary from 
institution to institution within the EU. For example, future research should focus on 
specific EU institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Commission 
and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Targeted attention to specific issues, such 
as human rights, trade, IT security or external relations, is also warranted. 
 
Another fruitful research investigation is exploring regional differences in citizens’ 
confidence in the EU and its political legitimacy. In the words of the Maritime Affairs 
Attaché to the EU (Interviewee #2), “While there is a general sense that citizens of 
many EU Member States are increasingly skeptical of the benefits of EU membership, it 
is important to recognize that EU citizens are not a homogenized group.” In other words, 
more granular country specific analyses are needed. Each EU Member State has a 
different culture, context, history, demographics, and experiences. In Greece for 
example, one of the hardest hit nations by economic and immigration crises, reforms 
will likely be received differently than say in Belgium, the headquarters of the European 
Union (located in downtown Brussels), who was recently faced with horrific acts of 
terrorism. Western European nations have also experienced a surprising rise in 
terrorism and issues of xenophobia and Islamophobia. By recognizing and 
acknowledging these contextual differences, one can more accurately evaluate citizen 
and elite opinions on the legitimacy and success of the Union. 
 
Additional research that delves into how the media, social media in particular, shape 
citizens’ knowledge would provide more elaboration on citizens’ trust in the EU and 
EU’s political legitimacy. The way the EU administration communicates their policies 
and reforms could highlight not only the ways in which the EU succeeds or fails at 
maintaining transparent and easy to understand communication with their citizens but 
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also how it is perceived and influences the average citizen. Both interviewees spoke to 
the roles that the media played in many EU crises. The Maritime Affairs Attaché to the 
EU (Interviewee #2) noted the press highlighting the case of the British EU referendum 
as a product of the voices of the average citizen not being heard. Media also provided 
little information to help citizens understand the EU and the referendum in order to be 
more informed voters. The Maritime Affairs EU Attaché went on to further explain the 
nuanced role of the media and communication thusly: 
 
“EU institutions are failing to communicate with their citizenry. The EU has had 
and continues to have an important role in the designation of social and human 
rights – on working conditions, social protection, poverty – yet since the 
economic downturn, the language of its communications has been too 
economically focused and it is failing to engage the media and hence its citizenry 
on these issues. It is too easy then for it be portrayed as has been the case a 
heartless bureaucracy whose primary concern is serving the interests of the 
market-it urgently needs to find” (Interviewee #2). 
Finally, a methodological suggestion would be to update the quantitative analyses of the 
kind presented here with more recent and cross-temporal examination. Much has 
occurred since the data for the 2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 were collected; there has 
been a rise in terror attacks, the debt crisis, various reform policies, and conflict, to 
name a few. The world is quite different from the one captured by the Eurobarometer 
seven years ago. A cross-temporal analysis could identify changes in the ways the 
average citizens and elites shape the political legitimacy of the EU. 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
Table 1.D. Controls 
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 
Concepts Dimensions Indicators Values and Responses  Statistics 
Socio-
demographics 
EU Regions 
 
Q1A       What is your nationality? 
                (n=27654) 
 
1 = Western Europe 
2 = Eastern Europe 
3 = Mediterranean 
 
40.5%  
41.0  
18.5 
  
Demographics 
 
D10     Sex/Gender 
           (n=30238) 
 
1 = Female
1 
53.5 
 
  
 
 
D11     How old are you? 
           (n=30238) 
1 = 15 – 24 years 
2 = 25 – 34 years 
3 = 35 – 44 years 
4 = 45 – 54 years 
5 = 55 – 64 years 
6 = 65 years and older 
12.6% 
15.7 
16.8 
17.0 
26.7 
21.2 
1 
QD10 (dummy interval): the omitted category Male is coded = 0. 
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Appendix B 
Consent Form and Interview Protocol 
Consent Form 
Dear interviewee, 
 
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor 
Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my 
research European Union citizens’ confidence in the European Union. 
 
You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of 
European politics. 
 
I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to a series of open-ended questions 
about citizen’s confidence in political institutions, more specifically the EU institutions, and what factors 
may impact this. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You can answer as many of the questions as 
you have time permits. The results of the research study may be presented at SCU’s Annual 
Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published (in a Sociology department 
publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and most likely the name of your organization 
in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your specific 
characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at +1 (408) 981-2572 or 
jfrydenberg@scu.edu or Dr. Fernandez at +1 (408) 554-4432 or mfernandez@scu.edu 
 
Sincerely, 
Jessy Frydenberg 
 
By signing below you are giving consent to participate in the above study.  
______________________      ____________________          ____________ 
Signature                                  Printed Name                         Date 
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you 
have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of 
Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591. 
 
 
Interview Schedule 
Interview Date and Time: _______________________ 
1. What is the TYPE of Organization where you learned about (and/or worked) citizens’ confidence 
in the EU and larger political institution?  
2. What is your position in this organization (formal title)?  
3. How long have you been in this position and in this organization?  
4. In your professional judgment, how confident are EU citizens of the EU? 
5. What are some factors that influence an individual’s confidence and trust in the EU and in political 
institutions at large? 
a. How about an Informed Citizenry, ie how much knowledge and understanding a citizen 
has of the EU, its purpose and its policies? 
b. How about their Quality of Life, ie an individual’s daily life on the ground, their lifestyle, 
job situation, financial situation, etc.? 
30
Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 15 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol15/iss1/5
35 
 
6. Is there anything else about the confidence and trust of EU citizens in the EU that I should know 
more about? 
 
Thank you very much for your time. If you wish to see a copy of my final paper, I would be glad to share it 
with you at the end of the winter quarter. If you have any further questions or comments for me, I can be 
contacted at jfrydenberg@scu.edu. Or if you wish to speak to my faculty advisor, Dr. Marilyn Fernandez, 
she can be reached at mfernandez@scu.edu. 
 
 
Appendix C 
Component Indices of Confidence in the EU 
Table 1.A.A EU Strengths (n = 13797) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concept Indicators Values and Responses  Statistics 
Index of EU 
Strengths 
QA7A    Generally speaking, do you think  
              that (YOUR COUNTRY)’s  
              membership of the EU is a good  
              or bad thing? 
3 = A good thing 
2 = Neither nor 
1 = A bad thing 
55.2% 
30.3 
14.5 
 QA9A    At the present time, would you 
say that, in general, things are 
going in the right or wrong 
direction in the EU? 
3 = Right direction 
2 = Neither nor  
1 = Wrong direction 
47.8% 
23.4 
28.8 
 
 QA10    Do you tend to trust or not trust 
the European Union? 
1 = Tend to trust
1
 58.6% 
 QA11    In general, does the EU conjure 
up for you a positive or negative 
image? 
5 = Very positive 
4 = Fairly positive 
3 = Neutral 
2 = Fairly negative 
1 = Very negative 
8.1% 
39.6 
36.6 
12.1 
3.6 
 QA12     What does the EU mean to you 
personally? 
Positive Meanings: 
…Peace 
…Economic prosperity 
…Democracy 
…Social protection 
…Freedom to travel, study and 
work anywhere in the EU 
…Cultural diversity 
…Stronger say in the world 
…Euro 
 
 
 
1 = Mentioned
2
 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
1 = Mentioned 
 
 
 
28% (8456) 
21.2% (6411) 
24.2% (7307) 
13% (3929) 
49.8% (15057) 
 
20.4% (6159) 
24.3% (7335) 
35.3% (10659) 
 QA12     What does the EU mean to you 
personally? 
Negative Meanings: 
…Unemployment 
…Bureaucracy 
…Waste of money 
…Loss of our cultural identity 
…More crime 
…Not enough control at external 
borders 
 
 
 
1 = Not Mentioned
3
 
1 = Not Mentioned 
1 = Not Mentioned 
1 = Not Mentioned 
1 = Not Mentioned 
1 = Not Mentioned 
 
 
 
85.7% (25913) 
81.7% (24716) 
82.0% (24790) 
88.5% (26753) 
83.9% (25377) 
85.8% (25954) 
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 QA14     Do you tend to trust or not trust  
              the Council of the EU? 
1 = Tend to trust 
 
61.0% 
 
 QA18B  On the whole, are you very  
              satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very  
              satisfied or not at all satisfied  
              with the way democracy works   
              in the EU? 
4 = Very satisfied 
3 = Fairly satisfied 
2 = Not very satisfied 
1 = Not at all satisfied 
7.7% 
54.3 
30.3 
7.8 
 
 QA20     Do you agree or disagree with  
              the following statement: What   
              brings the citizens of the  
              different countries together is  
              more important than what  
              separates them. 
4 = Totally agree 
3 = Tend to agree 
2 = Tend to disagree 
1 = Totally disagree 
32.5% 
51.6 
13.2 
2.7 
 
 QA20     Do you agree or disagree with  
              the following statement: The EU  
              is indispensable in meeting  
              global challenges. 
4 = Totally agree 
3 = Tend to agree 
2 = Tend to disagree 
1 = Totally disagree 
32.2% 
46.0 
16.3 
  5.5 
 QA25     Would you say that you are very  
               optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly  
               pessimistic or very pessimistic  
               about the future of the EU? 
4 = Very optimistic 
3 = Fairly optimistic 
2 = Fairly pessimistic 
1 = Very pessimistic 
  9.6% 
61.8 
23.7 
  5.0 
 Sub-Index of EU Strengths
4
 Mean (sd) 
Min – Max 
28.64 (6.09) 
7.0 – 43.0 
1
 QA10 and QA14 (dummy interval): the omitted category Tend Not to Trust is coded = 0. 
2 
QA12 (dummy interval): the omitted category Not mentioned is coded = 0.
 
3 
QA12 (dummy interval): the omitted category Mentioned is coded = 0. 
4 
Sub-Index of EU Strengths =
 
Nation Membership + EU Direction + EU Trust + Image of The EU + EU Personal 
Meaning+ Council of the EU Trust + Democracy Satisfaction
 
+ Citizens Brought Together + EU Indispensability + 
Future of the EU. Possible range: 7.0-43.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .06
**
 to .49
***
 and 
significant at .000 level. 
 
 
 
Table 1.A.B. EU Weaknesses (n = 13797) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concept Indicators Values and Responses  Statistics 
Index of EU 
Weaknesses 
QA20     Do you agree or disagree  
  with the following statement:  
  The European Union has  
  grown too rapidly. 
4 = Totally agree 
3 = Tend to agree 
2 = Tend to disagree 
1 = Totally disagree 
25.3% 
42.2 
27.3 
5.3 
 QA20     Do you you agree or  
 disagree with the following   
 statement: At the current time, the   
 EU is short of ideas and projects. 
4 = Totally agree 
3 = Tend to agree 
2 = Tend to disagree 
1 = Totally disagree 
17.0% 
37.5 
35.5 
9.9 
 
  
 
Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses
1
 
Mean (sd) 
Min – Max  
5.45 (1.38) 
2.0 – 8.0 
1 
Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses = EU Growth Too Rapid + EU Idea Shortage. Possible range: 2.0-8.0. Correlation 
between these indicators was .28
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
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Appendix D 
Component Indices of Informed Citizenry 
Table 1.B.A. General EU Knowledge (n = 11151 - 13731) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concept Indicators Values and Responses  Statistics 
Index of 
General 
EU 
Knowledge 
QA13. Have you heard of the Council of the 
EU? 
1 = Yes
1
 73.5% 
QA17. True or False: The EU currently consists 
of twenty-five member states. 
1 = False (Correct)
 2 
 
44.4% 
 
QA17.True or False: The Irish voted “yes” to 
the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty       
held on October 2
nd
, 2009. 
1 = True (Correct) 81.9% 
 QA17. True or False: The Euro area currently  
consists of twelve member states. 
1 = False (Correct) 43.9% 
 QA19A.  Do you tend to agree or tend to            
disagree with the statement: I understand  
how the European Union works. 
1 = Tend to agree
3 
 
49.3% 
 
 QA19B. Do you tend to agree or tend to                   
disagree with the statement: The interests of 
(OUR COUNTRY) are well taken into account 
in the EU. 
1 = Tend to agree 
 
44.2% 
  
Index of General EU Knowledge
4
 
Mean (sd) 
Min – Max 
3.71 (1.28) 
0.0 – 6.0 
1 
QA13 (dummy interval): the omitted category No is coded = 0.
 
2 
QA17 (dummy interval): the omitted category True/False (dependent on which is the correct answer) is coded = 0.
 
3 
QA19A/B (dummy interval): the omitted category Tend to Disagree is coded = 0.
 
4 
Index of General EU Knowledge = Heard of Council of EU + Member States + Lisbon Treaty + Euro Member States 
+ How EU Works + Interests of Own Country in EU. Possible range: 0.0–6.0. Correlations among these indicators 
range from .03
**
 to .30
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
 
 
Table 1.B.B. Knowledge of Policy (n = 13334 - 13409) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concept Indicators Values and Responses  Statistics 
Index of 
Knowledge 
of Policy 
QC6      Certain measures aimed at  
              combating the current economic  
              and financial crisis are currently  
              being discussed within  
              European institutions. How  
              effective would a more   
              important role for the EU at an   
              international level in regulating  
              financial services be in  
              combating the crisis? 
4 = Very effective 
3 = Fairly effective 
2 = Not very effective 
1 = Not at all effective 
18.7% 
59.3 
18.9 
  3.0 
 QC6      Certain measures aimed at 
combating the current economic 
and financial crisis are currently 
being discussed within European 
institutions. How effective would 
the surveillance and supervision 
by the EU of the activities of the 
most important international 
 
4 = Very effective 
3 = Fairly effective 
2 = Not very effective 
1 = Not at all effective 
 
 
24.6% 
53.4 
18.6 
3.4 
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financial groups be in combating 
the crisis? 
 QC6      Certain measures aimed at 
combating the current economic 
and financial crisis are currently 
being discussed within European 
institutions. How effective would a 
stronger coordination of economic 
and financial policies between all 
the EU member states be in 
combating the crisis? 
 
4 = Very effective 
3 = Fairly effective 
2 = Not very effective 
1 = Not at all effective 
 
26.6% 
56.0 
14.9 
2.5 
 QC6      Certain measures aimed at 
combating the current economic 
and financial crisis are currently 
being discussed within European 
institutions. How effective would a 
supervision by the EU whenever 
public money is used to rescue a 
financial institution be in 
combating the crisis? 
 
4 = Very effective 
3 = Fairly effective 
2 = Not very effective 
1 = Not at all effective 
 
29.0 
49.1 
17.9 
4.1 
 Sub-Index of Effective Combatting 
Measures
1
 
Mean (sd) 
Min – Max 
12.12 (2.46) 
4.0 – 16.0 
1 
Index of Knowledge of Policy = EU Regulating Financial Services + EU Surveillance and Supervision + Member 
Coordination of EU Policies + Supervision by the EU. Possible range: 4.0–16.0. Correlations among these indicators 
ranged from .52
***
 to .65
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
 
 
 
Appendix E 
Component Indices of Economic Elites and Their Health 
Table 1.C.A. Personal Economic Health (n = 12134 – 13797) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concepts Indicators Values and Responses  Statistics 
Index of 
Personal 
Economic 
Health 
QA1      On the whole, how satisfied are  
             you with the life you lead? 
4 = Very satisfied 
3 = Fairly satisfied 
2 = Not very satisfied 
1 = Not at all satisfied 
20.2% 
53.2 
19.2 
7.3 
 QA2A   How would you judge your 
current personal job situation? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather good 
2 = Rather bad 
1 = Very bad 
15.8% 
46.6 
23.4 
14.3 
 QA2A   How would you judge the current 
financial situation of your 
household? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather good 
2 = Rather bad 
1 = Very bad 
8.3% 
52.6 
29.3 
9.8 
 QC5      Could you tell me whether you 
totally agree or disagree with the 
following statement: Overall the 
Euro has mitigated the negative 
effects of the current financial 
and economic crisis. 
 
4 = Totally Agree 
3 = Tend to Agree 
2 = Tend to Disagree 
1 = Totally Disagree 
 
13.8% 
38.2 
31.5 
16.5 
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 QD4      Thinking about your purchasing 
power, that is to say the things 
that your household can afford, if 
you compare to your present 
situation 5 years ago, would you 
say it has improved or gotten 
worse? 
 
3 = Improved 
2 = Stayed the same 
1 = Got worse 
 
16.8% 
36.1 
47.0 
 
 D15A    What is your current occupation? 1 = Non-Active 
2 = Unskilled Workers 
3 = Merchants 
4 = Skilled Workers 
5 = Managers 
6= Professionals 
53.9% 
3.4 
4.5 
25.5% 
9.0 
3.6 
 D61       On the following scale, step ‘1’ 
corresponds to “the lowest level 
in the society”; step ‘10’ 
corresponds to “the highest level 
in society.” Could you tell me on 
which step you would place 
yourself? 
1 = Box 1 – lowest level  
2 = Box 2 
3 = Box 3 
4 = Box 4 
5 = Box 5 
6 = Box 6 
7 = Box 7 
8 = Box 8 
9 = Box 9 
10 = Box 10–to highest 
1.7% 
3.2 
8.9 
13.7 
28.7 
19.3 
15.6 
6.9 
1.3 
0.8 
  
Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health
1
 
Mean (sd) 
Min – Max 
21.5 (4.42) 
7.0 – 34.0 
1 
Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health = Life Satisfaction + Personal Job Satisfaction + Financial Situation 
Satisfaction + Mitigation of Negative Effects + Purchasing Power Change + Level in Society + Occupation. Possible 
range: 7.0 – 34.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .05
**
 to .66
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
 
 
 
Table 1.C.B. National Economic Health (n = 11906 - 13797) 
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 
Concepts Indicators Values and Responses  Statistics 
Index of 
National 
Economic 
Health 
QA2a    How would you judge the current  
             situation of the (Nationality)  
             economy? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather Good 
2 = Rather Bad 
1 = Very bad 
1.3% 
22.6 
49.3 
26.7 
 QA2a    How would you judge the current  
             situation of the European economy? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather Good 
2 = Rather Bad 
1 = Very bad 
2.3% 
34.1 
51.8 
11.8 
 QA2a    How would you judge the current  
             situation of the world economy? 
4 = Very Good 
3 = Rather Good 
2 = Rather Bad 
1 = Very bad 
15.9% 
59.2 
23.4 
1.5 
 QB5      Would you say that the European  
             economy is performing better,  
             performing worse or performing as  
             well as the American economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well As 
1 = Performing Worse 
37.2% 
28.8 
33.9 
 QB5      Would you say that the European  
              economy is performing better,  
              performing worse or performing as  
              well as the Japanese economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well As 
1 = Performing Worse 
28.9% 
20.1 
51.0 
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 QB5      Would you say that the European  
              economy is performing better,  
              performing worse or performing as  
              well as the Chinese economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well As 
1 = Performing Worse 
36.7% 
15.3 
48.0 
 QB5      Would you say that the European  
              economy is performing better,  
              performing worse or performing as  
              well as the Indian economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well As 1 
= Performing Worse 
 
60.4% 
13.7 
25.9 
 
 QB5      Would you say that the European  
              economy is performing better,  
              performing worse or performing as  
              well as the Russian economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well As 1 
= Performing Worse 
 
61.9% 
16.3 
21.9 
 
 QB5      Would you say that the European  
              economy is performing better,  
              performing worse or performing as  
              well as the Brazilian economy? 
3 = Performing Better 
2 = Performing As Well As 1 
= Performing Worse 
 
64.9% 
14.8 
20.2 
  
Sub-Index of National Economic Health
1
 
Mean (sd) 
Min – Max 
19.54 (3.58) 
9.0 – 30.0 
1 
Sub-Index of National Economic Health = National Economy + European Economy + World Economy + EU vs. 
American + EU vs. Japanese + EU vs. Chinese + EU vs. Indian + EU vs. Russian + EU vs. Brazilian. Possible range: 
9.0 – 30.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .05
**
 to .65
***
 and significant at .000 level. 
 
Appendix F 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix: Indices of Confidence in the EU, Informed Citizenry, and Their Quality 
of Life, Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 (n = 8832 – 13797) 
 
 
Index:  
Confidence 
in the EU 
Index: 
Informed 
Citizenry 
Index: 
Economic 
Elites Their 
Health 
Western Eastern Mediterranean Sex Age 
Index of 
Confidence in 
the EU
1
 
1.0  .53
*** 
.34
***
  -.09
**
 .02 .08
***
 -.04
*
  -.07
**
 
Index of 
Informed 
Citizenry
2
 
 1.0 .24
***
 -.08
**
   -.00 .11
***
  -.06
*
  -.01 
Index of 
Economic Elites 
& Their Health
3
 
  1.0 .24
***
  -.13
***
 -.12
***
  -.07
**
  -.06
*
 
Western
4
    1.0  -.65
***
  -.39
***
  -.05
*
 .12
***
  
Eastern
4
     1.0 -.35
***
 .05
*
  -.08
**
  
Mediterranean
4
      1.0 .00  -.02
*
 
Female (1)
5
       1.0 -.05
*
  
Age
6
         1.0 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
1
 Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding. 
 
36
Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 15 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol15/iss1/5
41 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alimi, Eitan, and David Meyer. 2011. “Seasons of change: Arab Spring and political 
opportunities.” Swiss Political Science Review 17(4):475-79. 
 
Arnold, Christine, Eliyahu Sparis, and Galina Zapryanova. 2012. “Trust in The 
Institutions of the European Union: A Cross-Country Examination.” European 
Integration Online Papers 16(8):1-39. 
 
BBC. 2016, March 4. “Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts.” 
BBC News, EUROPE. Retrieved on March 9, 2017. 
 
Beetham, David, and Christopher Lord. 2013. Legitimacy and the EU. New York, NY: 
Routledge. Print. 
 
Corbu, Nicoleta, and Oana Stefanita. 2013. “The EU Economic Crisis - Reflections in 
the Opinions of Citizens and Experts.” Romanian Journal of European 
Affairs 13(3):5-19. 
 
Chu, Ben. 2016, June 26. “Why did people really vote for Brexit? If we don't face the 
psychological reasons, we'll never bring Britain together.” The Independent, 
Voices. Retrieved on March 16, 2017. 
 
Crespy, Amandine. 2014. “Deliberative Democracy and the Legitimacy of the European 
Union: A Reappraisal of Conflict.” Political Studies 62(S1):81-98. 
 
Deacon, Liam. 2016, September 2. “EU President: ‘European Elites Detached From 
Reality.’” Breitbart News Network, Breitbart London.  Retrieved on March 16. 
 
Domhoff, G. William. 2005. Who Rules America? Power, Politics, & Social Change Fifth 
Edition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
 
European Affairs. (n.d.) “European Affairs.” The European Institute. Web. Retrieved on 
January 15. 
 
European Commission. 2009. “Eurobarometer 72.4: Globalization, Financial and 
Economic Crisis, Social Change and Values, EU Policies and Decision Making, 
and Global Challenges.” ICPSR30461-v1. Cologne, Germany: GESIS/Ann Arbor, 
MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 
2013-03-19. <http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR30461.v1>. 
 
European Union. 2016. “The EU In Brief.” Europa, European Union. Online: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en. Retrieved on March 
16, 2017. 
 
37
Frydenberg: Perspectives on the Political Legitimacy and Future of the Europe
Published by Scholar Commons, 2017
42 
 
Featherstone, Kevin. 2012, March 14. “The Maastricht Roots Of The Euro Crisis.” Social 
Europe. Web. < https://www.socialeurope.eu/2012/03/the-maastricht-roots-of-the-
euro-crisis/>. Retrieved on March 9, 2017. 
  
Friedman, Uri. 2016, June 26 “Should the Brexit Vote Have Happened at All?” The 
Atlantic, Global. Retrieved on March 16, 2017. 
Frum, David. 2016, June 24. “Why Britain Left.” The Atlantic, International. Web. 
Retrieved on March 16, 2017. 
 
Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin Page. 2014. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, 
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12(3):564–81. 
 
Hage, Jerald and Robert Dewar. 1973. “Elite Values Versus Organizational Structure in 
Predicting Innovation.” Administrative Science Quarterly 18(3):279-90. 
 
Harteveld, Eelco, Tom van der Meer, and Catherine De Vries. 2013. In Europe we 
Trust? Exploring Three Logics of Trust in the European Union. European Union 
Politics 14(4):542-565. 
<http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.scu.edu/10.1177/1465116513491018>.  
 
Hobolt, Sara. 2012. “Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union.” 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50:88-105. 
 
Holehouse, Matthew, and Ben Riley Smith. 2016, January 22. “EU leaders consider 
two-year suspension of Schengen rules.” The Telegraph, Europe. Retrieved on 
March 18, 2017. 
 
Hope, Christopher, Steven Swinfold, Peter Foster, and Laura Hughes, S. 2016, March 
22. “Brussels attacks: Europe is acting as a ‘welcome sign’ to terrorists, warns 
former Tory leader.” The Telegraph, Europe. Retrieved on March 18, 2017. 
 
Hunt, Alex, and Brian Wheeler. 2017, March 14. “Brexit: All You Need to Know About 
the UK Leaving the EU.” BBC Politics, BBC. Retrieved on March 16, 2017. 
 
Interviewee #1. November 7, 2016. International Staff Executive Officer for NATO.  
 
Interviewee #2. November 15, 2016. Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU for the Republic 
of Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
 
Karp, Jeffrey, Susan Banducci, and Shaun Bowler. 2003. “To know it is to love it? 
Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union.” Comparative Political 
Studies 36(3):271-92.  
 
Kirk, Ashley. 2017, February 8. “European debt crisis: It's not just Greece that's 
drowning in debt.” The Telegraph, News. Retrieved on March 9, 2017. 
 
38
Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 15 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol15/iss1/5
43 
 
Kumlin, Staffan. 2009. “Blaming Europe? Exploring the Variable Impact of National 
Public Service Dissatisfaction on EU Trust.” Journal of European Social Policy 
19(5): 408–20. 
 
Lopez, Matias. 2013. “Elite Theory.” International Sociological Association, SAGE 
Publications. 
 
Mason, Paul. 2016, November 28. “The European elite have developed a death wish.” 
The Guardian, European Union: Opinion. Retrieved on March 20, 2017. 
 
McCormick, John. 2014. Understanding the European Union, A Concise Introduction 6th 
Edition. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Mcdonald-Gibson, Charlotte. 2017, March 20. “Ever more divided union: As the dream 
of a united Europe turns 60, can the E.U. escape the grave?” Time Magazine, 
World. Print. 
 
Meyer, Christoph. 1999. “Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the 
European Union’s Communication Deficit.” Journal of Common Market Studies 
37(4):617-39. 
 
Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. Oxford University Press. 
 
Mills, C. Wright. 1958. “The Structure of Power in American Society.” The British 
Journal of Sociology 9(1):29-41. 
 
Munoz, Jordi, Mariano Torcal, and Eduard Bonet. 2011. “Institutional Trust and 
Multilevel Government in the European Union: Congruence or Compensation?” 
European Union Politics 12(4):551-74. 
 
Parsons, Talcott. 1975. “The Present Status of ‘Structural-Functional’ Theory in 
Sociology.” Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory. New York, NY: 
The Free Press. 
 
Pearce, Matt, and Sheldon Chad. 2016, March 23. “Brussels attacks also shatter 
confidence in Europe’s open borders.” Los Angeles Times, EUROPE. Retrieved 
on March 20, 2017. 
 
Peck, Tom. 2016, June 10. “EU Referendum: British public wrong about nearly 
everything, survey shows.” The Independent, UK Politics. Retrieved on March 
16, 2017. 
 
Peek, Andrew. 2016, March 22. “Andrew Peek: Terrorist attacks will finish the EU.” 
Daily News, Opinion. Retrieved on March 20. 
 
39
Frydenberg: Perspectives on the Political Legitimacy and Future of the Europe
Published by Scholar Commons, 2017
44 
 
Powers, Charles. 2010. Making Sense of Social Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
Primozic, Marjetica, and Cene Bavec. 2009. “Personal Values and Trust of Europeans 
in National and EU Institutions.” Uprava/Administration 7(2):7-44.  
 
Robertson, Nic. 2016, June 24. “A look at Brexit: Why are the Brits thumbing their noses 
at Europe?” CNN, Politics. Retrieved on March 16, 2017. 
 
Rousseau, Richard. 2014. “The ‘Democratic Deficit’ and Legitimacy Problems of the 
European Union: Elements of the Debate.” Online Journal Modelling the New 
Europe 13:10-30. 
 
Stefanova, Boyka Marinova. 2016. “Returning to Europe as Reluctant Europeans: 
Revisiting Tends in Public Support for the European Union in Central and 
Eastern Europe Twelve Years After the 2004 EU Accession.” Croatian Yearbook 
of European Law and Policy 12: 275-97. 
 
Sternberg, Claudia. 2013. The Struggle for EU Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 1950 – 
2005. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
The Economist Data Team. 2016, March 23. “Europe’s migrant crisis in numbers.” The 
Economist, Daily Chart. Retrieved on March 9, 2017. 
 
The Economist Special Report. 2017, March 25. “The future of the European Union.” 
The Economist, Special Report. Retrieved on April 6, 2017. 
 
Walton, Mark. 2016, June 24. “Many UK voters didn’t understand Brexit, Google 
searches suggest.” ARS Technica, Law and Disorder. Retrieved on March 20, 
2017. 
 
Williams, Thomas. 2017, January 16. “Europe gears up for ‘record levels’ of new 
migrants in 2017.” Breitbart News Network, Breitbart London. Retrieved on 
March 20, 2017. 
  
40
Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 15 [2017], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol15/iss1/5
